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TOPIC II.A.3
HENRY HANSMANN & UGO MATTEI
Trust Law in the United States. A Basic Study of Its
Special Contribution
In the United States, academic commentary and law school cur-
ricula continue to focus on the private trust in its historical role as a
device for intrafamily wealth transfers, a rather technical and nar-
row ground to approach our topic. Vastly more important is today the
enormous - though commonly neglected - role that private trusts
have come to play in the American capital markets.' To take just the
most conspicuous examples, pension funds and mutual funds, both of
which are generally organized as trusts, together now hold roughly
forty per cent of all U.S. equity securities and thirty per cent of corpo-
rate and foreign bonds.2 Similarly, turning from the demand side to
the supply side of the securities markets, asset securitization trusts
are now the issuers of a large fraction of all outstanding American
debt securities - more than $2 trillion worth.3
This report rather then following the details of trust law as de-
scribed in American law books will focus on the general economic
functions served by a separate law of trusts. We shall explore what
the law of trusts adds to the law of contract and agency. That is,
what useful relationships can be established with the law of trusts
that cannot be established with roughly similar ease using just the
more basic tools of contract and agency law? In very general terms,
HENRY HANSMANN is Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
UGO MATTEI is Alfred and Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Compar-
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This Report is an American based abridgment of a broader comparative study;
the complete essay is Hansmann & Mattei, "The Functions of Trust Law: A Compara-
tive Legal and Economic Analysis," NYU L. Rev. 434 (1998). A version, more focused
on the civil law alternatives to trust is published as Ch. 7 of Ugo Mattei, Comparative
Law and Economics (1997).
1. A recent and important exception to the general neglect of the new commer-
cial trusts is Langbein, "The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of
Commerce," 107 Yale L.J. 165-89 (1997).
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1996 523, Table No. 806 (1996). Only 14 years earlier, in 1980,
private pension funds and mutual funds held only 20% of equities (though 35% of
bonds), id., and the percentage of mutual funds organized as trusts was also much
lower.
3. Ingo Walter & Roy Smith, Global Banking 201, Figure 7-6 (1997).
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our answer is that the most important contribution of the law of
trusts is that it facilitates the partitioning of assets into bundles that
can conveniently be pledged separately to different classes of credi-
tors. Of particular importance in this respect is the use of trust law
to shield trust assets from claims of the trustee's personal creditors.
In contrast, the function of trust law that is the primary subject of
the literature in the common law countries, namely the creation and
enforcement of fiduciary duties, seems a relatively unimportant rea-
son for maintaining a separate law of trusts.
1. TRUST AND EQUITY
In a prototypical Anglo-American trust, three parties are in-
volved: the "settlor" transfers property to the "trustee," who is
charged with the duty to administer the property for the benefit of
the "beneficiary." Any of these three roles may be played by more
than one person. Also, the same person can play more than one of the
three roles. In particular, the settlor and the beneficiary can be the
same person, in which case the trust involves a simple delegation of
responsibility for managing property from the settlor/beneficiary to
the trustee.
The Anglo-American concept of the trust, together with the eq-
uity jurisprudence of which it forms a part, are the fortuitous product
of the peculiar historical path followed by English law.
Prior to the intervention of equity, an effort to create an enforcea-
ble trust-like relationship under the common law would fail. The
Trustee would become the full owner of the property in trust and her
obligation to administer that property for the advantage of the Bene-
ficiary would be purely moral: because she was the full owner,
neither the Settlor nor the Beneficiary could claim anything against
the Trustee in a common law court. Ultimately equity, in contrast,
recognized that, while the Trustee was the owner at law, her right
was restricted by another property interest, that of the Beneficiary. 4
Beneficiaries were therefore provided with equitable remedies
against an unfaithful Trustee. This system of rights and remedies
was described by saying that the Trustee had legal ownership while
the Beneficiary had equitable ownership.5
This subdivision of property rights caused little conceptual diffi-
culty in the common law system which, from an early stage, recog-
nized that property rights need not be concentrated in the hands of a
4. A forerunner of equity in this respect was the canon law. Helmholz, "The
Early Enforcement of Uses," 79 Col. L. Rev. 1503 (1979), shows that ecclesiastical
courts were available to sanction directions given by testators to hold property accord-
ing to the testator's will.
5. For an early example see J. H. Baker & S. F. C. Milsom, Sources of English
Legal History 103 (1986).
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single owner but rather could be divided among more than one indi-
vidual, either in time (estates) or in content (incidents of tenure).
Since the beneficiaries were considered property owners, and not
holders of mere contractual rights, it naturally followed that they
could claim their interests against everybody (except against a pur-
chaser for value without notice) and had proprietary remedies. On
the other hand, since the trustee held legal title to the trust property,
his transfers of property were not impaired by the existence of the
trust.6 Rather, when the trustee exchanged the trust property for
other property, the beneficiary's interest and the trustee's duties at-
tached to the new property received in the exchange. Moreover, if the
trustee wrongfully transferred trust property to somebody other than
a purchaser in good faith without notice of the trust, then, through
the remedy called "tracing," the beneficiary's property interest con-
tinued to attach to the property, and the transferee was considered to
hold the property and all of its proceeds in trust for the beneficiary,
who was the equitable or beneficial owner of the property.7
2. THE BASIC ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUST
At its core, a modem trust involves contractual relationships8 .
The institution of the trust offers a set of standard terms for those
relationships - in effect, default terms that will be implied in the
absence of explicit language to the contrary in the parties' contract.
The utility of the trust as a legal institution turns on the efficiency of
having this set of standard terms, which in turn requires, in general,
two things: (1) the standard terms must be efficient in themselves,
which is roughly to say that they are the terms that the parties would
agree to if they could bargain costlessly between themselves; (2) the
transaction costs of negotiating at least some of those standard terms
would be significantly higher if the parties could employ only the ba-
sic law of contract, property, and agency. In short, the trust is a use-
ful legal form if it reduces in an important way the transaction costs
of contracting. (To be sure, this formulation is a bit too simple;9 we
shall refine it further below.)
To see whether and how the law of trusts meets this test, we
shall examine, in turn, the principal transactional relationships af-
fected by a trust.
6. For discussion, see Rudden & Graziadei, "Il Diritto Inglese dei Beni ed il
Trust: Dalle Res al Fund," Quadrimestre 458 (1992).
7. See supra n. 1, at 295.
8. See Langbein, "The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts," 105 Yale L. J.
625 (1995).
9. On the economics of default rules generally, see Schwartz, "The Default Rule
Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law," 3 S. Cal. L. Rev. 389 (1993).
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3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SETTLOR AND TRUSTEE
With respect to the contractual relationship between the Settlor
and the Trustee, the role of the law of trusts in providing a standard
set of default terms is conspicuous. So long as the parties character-
ize the relationship they wish to establish as a "trust," or even if they
just make clear their intention to create a trust-like relationship,10
the law of trusts automatically inserts a variety of standard terms
into their agreement. These terms comprise the core of the trust rela-
tionship. They include the powers of the Trustee, such as the author-
ity to incur expenses in the administration of the property in trust
and the power to lease, mortgage, or sell the property in trust where
appropriate. 1 ' They also include the duties of the Trustee toward the
Settlor (and, by derivation, toward the latter's intended third party
beneficiary, the Beneficiary), such as the duty to preserve the trust
property and render it productive, and to pay income to the Benefici-
ary. 12 Among those duties are the Trustee's fiduciary duties: the
duty of care (duty to exercise reasonable care and skill)13 and the
duty of loyalty (the duty not to deal with the property in trust con-
trary to the Settlor's and the Beneficiary's interests). 14
These default terms are unquestionably a convenience. But that
is all they are. If the law of trusts did not exist, the Settlor and the
Trustee could still establish between themselves the obligations that
are at the core of the private trust.
The law of trusts relieves the Settlor and the Trustee of the bur-
den of explicitly spelling out all of the Trustee's powers and duties.
Also, to the extent that the parties seek to deviate from the standard
default rules (which the law of trusts generally permits), the law of
trusts puts the burden on the parties to be explicit, and thus helps
assure that both parties are aware of, and thoughtfully accept, those
nonstandard terms. Yet essentially the same results could be
achieved through contract in the absence of trust law simply through
the use of privately-drafted standard form contracts. This is true, in
particular, for the fiduciary duties of the Trustee, which can easily be
established by contract - most obviously, just by inserting into the
contract between the Settlor and the Trustee the same language con-
cerning the Trustee's duties that presently appears in the sections of
the Restatement of Trusts describing a trustee's duties.
Indeed, since the Trustee would generally be deemed by the law
to be the Settlor's agent, in the absence of trust law the law of agency
10. See Restatement of Trusts (Second) §§23, 24 (concerning the forms in which
the intention to create a trust can be manifested).
11. Id. §§186-96.
12. Id. §§169-85.
13. Id. §174.
14. Id. §170.
[Vol. 46
TRUST LAW
would apply and would itself, if the parties' contract did not say
otherwise, impose fiduciary duties on the Trustee that are quite close
to those implied by the law of trusts.15 To be sure, the duty of loyalty
that is the default rule in trust law is slightly more rigorous than
that implied by the law of agency. 16 This is appropriate. In trust-like
relationships the principals involved (the Settlor and the Beneficiary)
are commonly not well situated to monitor the Trustee in fulfilling
her duties as their agent - for example, because the Settlor is dead
and the Beneficiary is incompetent or a child. Nevertheless, in the
absence of trust law, the Settlor and the Trustee would still be free to
establish this stricter duty of loyalty by explicit contractual provi-
sions that substitute it for the default rules of agency law.
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY
The standard rule in trust law is that the Beneficiary has the
power to enforce the Trustee's performance of her duties.' 7 The obvi-
ous rationale for this rule is that otherwise there might be nobody
with both the incentive and the capacity to police the Trustee.
The traditional English rule of common law is that third party
beneficiaries of a contract have no authority to enforce the contract. 18
As a consequence, in England the law of trusts historically served,
and still serves, the important function of permitting the creation of
trust-like relationships with effective powers of enforcement - some-
thing that could not be done in the absence of trust law. In other
common law jurisdictions, however, this is not the case. In the
United States, for example, after 1859 the old common law restric-
tions on third party enforcement were gradually abandoned, with the
result that today an intended third party beneficiary of a contract
will be permitted to enforce that contract.' 9 Consequently, trust law
in the United States is no longer necessary to achieve that result. A
more vital function of trust law lies in arranging the expectations of
the personal creditors of the Settlor, Trustee, and Beneficiary.
15. Compare Restatement (Second) of Agency §§387-90 with Restatement (Second)
of Trusts §170 (duty of loyalty); Restatement (Second) of Agency §386 with Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts §174 (duty of care and skill).
16. A trustee dealing with trust property on his own behalf is held to a standard
of fairness even if he obtains the informed consent of the beneficiary, while such a
standard of fairness is not imposed on similar transactions between an agent and his
principal. Compare Restatement (Second) of Agency §390, comment c, with Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts §170, comment w.
17. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§197-99.
18. See Vernon Palmer, The Paths to Privity: The History of Third Party Benefici-
ary Contracts in English Law (1992); Andrews, "Does a Third Party Beneficiary Have
a Right in English Law?," 1988 Legal Studies 14.
19. See Waters, "The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Benefi-
ciary Rule," 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1111 (1985).
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5. THE BENEFICIARY'S CREDITORS
One important way in which the Beneficiary can derive benefits
from the property in trust is to offer his interest in it as security for
credit, whether the Beneficiary does this explicitly by pledging his
interest in the property in trust to creditors or implicitly by inducing
persons to extend unsecured credit to him in reliance on the Benefici-
ary's overall wealth, which includes his interest in the property in
trust. Consequently, one would expect that the Settlor would gener-
ally wish to permit the Beneficiary's creditors to be able to levy on the
Beneficiary's interest in the property in trust in case of the Benefici-
ary's insolvency, and that the Settlor would therefore wish to provide
for this result through his contract with the Trustee. Thus, it is rea-
sonable for the law of trusts to make this result one of the standard
terms that will be imputed to the parties absent explicit provision to
the contrary - as, in fact, it does.20
On the other hand, if the Settlor is concerned that the Benefici-
ary is irresponsible and will too quickly encumber all of the property
in trust, the Settlor might wish to avoid the standard result and, in-
stead, make the Beneficiary's interest in the property in trust un-
available to the Beneficiary's creditors. American trust law in fact
permits the settlor to do this by creating a "spendthrift trust" that
bars the beneficiary's creditors from levying on the beneficiary's in-
terest in the trust.21 This is a reasonable arrangement, except that it
runs the risk of misleading persons who extend credit to the Benefici-
ary on the basis of his apparent wealth, only to discover subsequently
that this wealth is beyond their reach. The efficiency of the spend-
thrift trust is consequently debatable; the paternalistic protection it
provides for hapless beneficiaries may not outweigh the costs it en-
genders by confusing creditors' expectations. Not surprisingly, there-
fore, the wisdom of recognizing spendthrift trusts has been a
perennial subject of controversy in American legal commentary, 22
20. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §147.
21. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§150-55.
22. Famous and forceful criticism of the spendthrift trust was voiced long ago by
Harvard Law School Professor John Chipman Gray in his book Restraints on the
Alienation of Property (1883), written in response to the Supreme Court's validation of
spendthrift trusts in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875). ("The general introduction
of spendthrift trusts would be to form a privileged class, who could indulge in every
speculation, could practice every fraud, and, provided they kept on the safe side of
criminal law, could yet roll in wealth." Id. at 262.) A recent installment in the debate
is Hirsch, "Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspec-
tives," 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (1995), which surveys the issues at length and argues
(somewhat casually) that, whatever may have been the case in the past, spendthrift
trusts today do not create serious problems for creditors in assessing a debtor's
creditworthiness - or that, if they do, the resulting distortions in credit terms tend to
be offset by other information problems that creditors face.
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and English law has refused to recognize spendthrift
trusts.
23
In the United States, a third party beneficiary's enforceable in-
terest in a contract can be assumed by a trustee in bankruptcy for the
benefit of the beneficiary's creditors. 24 Thus, the default rule estab-
lished under the law of trusts is replicated by contract law, and the
law of trusts adds little. The spendthrift trust, on the other hand,
appears difficult to replicate through the general tools of contract
law25 - for the same reasons, presumably, that it is a controversial
device in the law of trusts.
6. THE SETTLOR'S CREDITORS
Under trust law, the settlor's creditors generally cannot reach
the trust property so long as the settlor is not also a beneficiary of the
trust.26 This is a logical result; it follows what we can generally pre-
sume to be the intent of the contracting parties (and particularly the
23. The case that remains controlling to this day is Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng.
Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811). England has, however, developed alternatives to the spendthrift
trust, principally in the form of "discretionary trusts" and "protective trusts" that give
the trustee substantial discretion concerning distributions to the beneficiary, and
thus leave the beneficiary with an interest that is considered too uncertain to be
reachable by the beneficiary's creditors. See E. N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts 367,
429 (1936); George Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees 221 (1987).
24. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(1), defines the bankrupt estate as
consisting of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case." Among the debtor's legal interests that become a part of the
bankruptcy estate under the Code are his choses in action and claims against third
parties. These choses in action and claims clearly include rights of action based upon
contract. See, e.g., Guarles House Apartments v. Plunkett (In re Plunkett), 23 B.R.
392 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982); Varisco v. Oroweat (In re Varisco), 16 B.R. 634 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1981); Rau v. Ryerson (In re Ryerson), 739 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1984); Buck-
eye Union Insurance Co. V. Four Star Construction Co. (In re Four Star Construction
Co.), 151 B.R. 817 (Bankr. N.D. OH 1993). Whether a third party beneficiary has an
enforceable contractual right - and hence one that clearly becomes part of the bank-
ruptcy estate - turns on his classification as an "intended" or "incidental" benefici-
ary. And the definition of "intended beneficiary" in this regard is broad enough to
cover virtually anyone who is the Recipient in a trust-like relationship. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §§302, 304, 315. For cases involving a bankruptcy trustee's as-
sumption of a debtor's rights as a contractual third party beneficiary, see, e.g.,
Newton v. Johnston (In re Johnson and Associates, Inc.), 845 F.2d 1395 (6th Cir.
1987); Nat'l Tax Credit Partners v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 1994); Whinnery v.
Bank of Onalaska (In re Taggatz), 106 B.R. 983 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1989); Farmer v.
Crocker Nat'l Bank (In re Swift Aire Lines, Inc.), 20 B.R. 286 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982).
25. To avoid the consequences described in supra, the Settlor and the Trustee
might provide explicitly in their contract that, while the Beneficiary is intended to
benefit from the Trustee's performance, the Beneficiary is to have no powers to en-
force the contract. But, even if unenforceability would be sufficient to ensure exclu-
sion of the Beneficiary's interest from his estate in bankruptcy, that exclusion would
come at the price of eliminating the legal accountability of the Trustee to the
Beneficiary.
26. This is the negative implication of Restatement (Second) of Trusts §156 (credi-
tors can reach settlor's interest in a trust where settlor is also a beneficiary of the
trust). See also 11 U.S.C. §541(b)(1), discussed infra n. 34.
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settlor), and in general it should not mislead the settlor's creditors
(who have no reason to rely on the value of the trust property in ex-
tending credit to the settlor, since title to the property is in the hands
of the trustee and no material benefits are flowing to the settlor from
the property).
On the other hand, trust law provides that if the settlor himself
retains a beneficial interest in the trust property, then his creditors
can reach his interest in that property even in the face of explicit
efforts on his part to provide, in the terms of the trust, that his credi-
tors may not reach his interest.27 This result, too, is logical, to pre-
vent the settlor from intentionally or unintentionally misleading his
creditors as to his ability to repay them.
As with the rights of the Beneficiary's creditors, however, these
are apparently the results that would obtain even if the parties did
not have the advantage of the law of trusts, and had to rely only upon
general principles of contract law.28
7. THE TRUSTEE'S CREDITORS
Under the common law of trusts, if the trustee becomes insolvent, the
trust property she administers is unavailable to satisfy the trustee's
obligations to her personal creditors. 29
This arrangement has important advantages. To begin with, it is
what all three of the principal parties would generally prefer. The
Settlor presumably wishes to transfer the value of the trust property
to the Beneficiary, free of possibilities that the transfer will be frus-
trated through forfeiture of the property to the Trustee's creditors.
To be sure, the ability to use the trust property as security for credit
is one means by which the Settlor might compensate the Trustee for
the latter's efforts. But direct cash payments should nearly always be
a superior form of compensation.
Furthermore, in typical situations in which trusts are employed,
often neither the Settlor nor the Beneficiary is well situated to moni-
tor the other business affairs of the Trustee, and in particular to
check regularly on the Trustee's solvency. Thus, they are in a poor
27. Id.
28. Absent the law of trusts, if a Settlor transfers to the Trustee the title to the
property, in trust and enters into a contract with the Trustee under which the latter
is to manage the property exclusively for the benefit of a third party Beneficiary, then
the only interest that the Settlor retains is a contractual right to enforce the Trustee's
duties toward the Beneficiary; he has no contractual claim on the interest or principal
of the property in trust to be levied on. See 11 U.S.C. §541(b)(1), which excludes from
the bankruptcy estate any power that the debtor may only exercise solely for the ben-
efit of a person other than the debtor.
29. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§541(a)(1), 541(d); Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §§306-08, 221; Todd v. Pettit, 108 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1939); American Serv. Co.
V. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1941); In re Tate Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971
(W.D. Pa. 1949).
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position to control the extent to which the Trustee exposes the prop-
erty in trust to claims of the Trustee's creditors. (Consider, again, the
classic situation in which the Settlor is dead and the Beneficiary is
incompetent or a child.) In contrast, with the rules of trust law in
effect, simple accounting measures can easily signal, to potential
creditors of the Trustee, which of the property in the Trustee's pos-
session is held in trust and hence is not available to satisfy the credi-
tors in case of the Trustee's insolvency, so that the creditors can
adjust their terms of credit to reflect the amount of security available
to them. Indeed, by establishing the trust as a standard form, the
law of trusts makes such signalling easy: the Trustee need simply
use the words "in trust" when registering the property or otherwise
dealing in it.
Of course, where the Trustee is not careful in such signalling,
there arises the possibility of inducing inappropriate reliance on the
property in trust by the Trustee's creditors. In such cases the law of
trusts nevertheless favors the beneficiary. Indeed, even if the trustee
intentionally breaches her duty to the beneficiary, and specifically
pledges trust property as security for credit extended to the trustee
by a third party creditor who is unaware that the property is held in
trust, the creditor will not be permitted to enforce his security inter-
est in the trust property, which instead will remain available only to
the beneficiary.30 Even here, the law apparently presumes that the
Trustee's creditors are in a better position than the Beneficiary to
look out for themselves (or, to use the conventional Calabresian ter-
minology, that they are the cheapest cost avoiders).
In sum, where claims of the Trustee's personal creditors are in-
volved, the default rule implied by the common law of trusts appears
to economize on total information and monitoring costs for all the
contracting parties involved - the Trustee, the Settlor, the Benefici-
ary, and the Trustee's personal creditors.
In the absence of trust law, the result would presumably be the
reverse: since the Trustee holds title to the property in trust, the
Property in trust would be presumed subject to levy by the Trustee's
creditors. 31
30. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §286. The law is different in the case of third
party purchasers of the legal title to trust property who act in good faith and pay
reasonable value: they get good title to the trust property even if the trustee sells in
breach of trust. Id. §284. It is only those third parties to whom the breaching trustee
transfers mere equitable title who are disfavored vis-a-vis the beneficiary.
31. The question "what would be the rights of the Trustee's creditors in the
United States, with respect to the property in trust, absent the law of trusts?" is not
entirely well defined in American law. The relevant provision in the bankruptcy law
does not explicitly refer to trusts. Rather, it states:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the comencement of the case, only
legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real
property, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to
which the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the servicing of
1998]
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In principle, even without the law of trusts the same insolvency
rule concerning the Trustee's personal creditors could be established
by contractual means. The Trustee could insert, in each contract she
enters into with one of her personal creditors, a term providing that
the creditor foreswears any claim against the property in trust in
case of the Trustee's breach. Moreover, the Trustee could promise, in
her contract with the Settlor, to put such a term in every personal
contract that the Trustee enters into. Yet the transaction costs of
this approach would often be prohibitively high. Consider, as one ob-
vious example, the difficulties that would arise when the Trustee
deals with other parties that themselves use standard contractual
forms. There would also remain the risk that, even where it is other-
wise practicable, the Trustee would sometimes omit to insert the re-
quired contractual term out of carelessness or opportunism, and the
Trustee's performance in this regard would be very difficult for either
the Settlor or the Beneficiary to police.
The rule governing claims to the property in trust in case of the
Trustee's insolvency is therefore, unlike the other trust doctrines we
have discussed so far, an important contribution of the law of trusts,
permitting parties to enter into useful contractual relationships that
can be replicated only at substantial cost, if at all, using just the basic
tools of contract and agency law.
8. LIABILITY OF THE TRUSTEE
Under trust law, the trustee is presumed personally liable to
third persons on all contractual and other obligations she incurs in
the course of administering the trust.32 The trustee can avoid such
personal liability on contracts, however, if she makes it clear when
such mortgage or interest, becomes property of the estate . . .only to the
extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any
equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §541(d). It is well established that this rule immu-
nizes trust property from claims of the trustee's personal creditors in bankruptcy; see
the cases cited supra n. 56. If American law were to be deprived, not just of the law of
trusts, but of the law of equity in general, presumably the provision just quoted would
have no reference, and any property to which the bankrupt holds legal title would
become part of the bankruptcy estate.
But what if one were to eliminate just the law of trusts in the United States,
while retaining the law of equity? Absent trust law, as we have suggested, the natu-
ral alternative would be to transfer title to the property in trust to the Trustee and
make the latter the agent of the Settlor, the Beneficiary, or both. Yet "If [an agent]
has title, either legal or equitable, to property which he holds subject to equitable
duties to deal with it for the benefit of another, he is a trustee." Restatement (Second)
of Agency, §14B, Comment b. Thus, to eliminate the law of trusts would seem to elim-
inate (by definition) the possibility of an agent who holds only legal title while the
"equitable" interest lies elsewhere. While it is perfectly conceivable - and common
- for a legal regime to adopt the law of trusts without adopting the law of equity in
general, it is harder to know what it would mean to have the law of equity without the
law of trusts.
32. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§261, 262.
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signing a' contract that she is signing strictly as trustee for the trust
and not in her personal capacity. 33 Moreover, and noncontractual li-
ability imposed on the trustee as title holder is limited to the extent
she can obtain indemnity from the trust.3 4
This seems the sensible approach. In most cases, so long as the
third party creditors are aware that they are dealing with property in
trust, it is probably inefficient to make the trustee personally liable
for obligations entered into for the benefit of the Beneficiary in the
course of administering the property in trust. The reduced cost of
credit for the trust resulting from such a rule would, in general, be
more than offset by the increase in the cost of credit for the Trustee in
her personal (and other business) transactions owing to the increased
complexity in monitoring credit that the rule would impose on all of
the creditors involved. Moreover, the incentive effects of such a rule
for the Trustee also appear unattractive, since the rule would tend to
induce severe conservatism by giving the Trustee a personal stake in
the losses, but not the gains, resulting from her administration of the
property in trust. Thus, the efficient rule would seem to be no per-
sonal liability to third parties for a non-negligent Trustee acting
within the scope of her authority.
If limited liability for the Trustee were the unconditional default
rule, however, there would arise the possibility that creditors might
be misled into believing that they are dealing with the Trustee in her
personal capacity rather than just in her capacity as Trustee, and
would consequently extend credit on more generous terms than they
would have if they had realized that they could not rely upon the
Trustee's personal assets for security. By requiring that the Trustee
give creditors clear notice before she can avoid personal liability, the
prevailing trust rule assures both limited liability for the Trustee and
clear signalling to creditors of the assets on which they can rely. And,
here as elsewhere, the existence of the trust as a standard form
makes it easy for the Trustee to send this signal because, in signing a
contract, she need simply use the phrase "as trustee for X and not
individually" to convey to creditors what the situation is.3 5 Absent
trust law, the Trustee would need to insert explicit language in each
of her contracts insulating her personal assets from creditors' claims
- a costly burden that would presumably be impractical in many
circumstances.
In short, trust law establishes here a "penalty default" - that is,
a default rule of liability for the Trustee that is generally inefficient,
but that gives the Trustee an incentive to reverse the rule by re-
vealing clearly to third parties that she is, in fact, just a Trustee, and
33. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §263.
34. Id. §265.
35. Id., comment a.
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that the third parties may turn only to designated property in trust
for their security.36
9. LIABILITY OF THE SETTLOR
Under trust law, the settlor as such is not personally subject to
liabilities incurred in the administration of the trust.3 7 Where the
Settlor is not also a Beneficiary, this rule is easy to understand. The
Settlor typically has little or no control over the ongoing administra-
tion of the property in trust; indeed, the default rule in trust law is
that the settlor has no right to enforce the trustee's duties. 38 Fur-
ther, total monitoring costs for the creditors of the property in trust
and the personal creditors of the Settlor will likely be minimized if
the former creditors need only monitor the property in trust and not
the personal finances of the Settlor, while the latter creditors need
only do the reverse. Finally, by requiring that a Trustee indicate that
she is acting "as trustee," the law of trusts effectively assures that
creditors are on notice that the Settlor's personal assets not are
pledged as security for liabilities incurred by the Trustee. (We post-
pone to the following section the case in which the Settlor is also a
Beneficiary.)
In the absence of trust law, and with only contract, agency, and
property law to work with, creation of a trust-like relationship in
which the Settlor is free of personal liability would be difficult. In
particular, if (as seems the natural alternative) the Trustee were
made the agent of the Settlor, contracts entered into by the Trustee
would generally be presumed to bind the Settlor as principal. The
latter result could be avoided by putting a specific waiver of the Set-
tlor's liability into all contracts entered into by the Trustee in connec-
tion with the property in trust, but for the reasons noted earlier this
individual contracting approach would likely be both unreliable for
the Settlor and costly or impractical for the Trustee.
10. LIABILITY OF THE BENEFICIARY
Trust law also provides that the beneficiary is not personally
subject to contractual commitments and other liabilities incurred in
the administration of the trust.39 In the absence of trust law, this
result might .be difficult to obtain even where the Beneficiary is not
36. On penalty defaults in general, see Ayres & Gertner, "Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules," 99 Yale L. J. 87 (1989);
Schwartz, supra n. 33.
37. Pottorff v. Dean, 77 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1933). The principal exception is the
case in which the settlor - particularly in the role of combined settlor/beneficiary -
retains sufficient control over the conduct of the trustee as to make the trustee the
settlor's agent. See the discussion of beneficiary liability immediately below.
38. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §200, Comment b.
39. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§274-77.
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the Settlor: an effort to establish a trust-like relationship could well
lead to the Trustee being characterized under the law as the Benefici-
ary's agent, with the consequence that contracts entered into by the
Trustee for the Beneficiary's benefit would bind the Beneficiary as
well, whether or not the third parties knew that the Trustee was act-
ing for the Beneficiary. 40 Indeed, absent the law of trusts, it would be
difficult to establish a trust-like relationship without the Trustee be-
ing characterized as the agent of either the Settlor, the Beneficiary,
or both, with the result that at least one of these two parties would be
personally liable for obligations of the trust. (Thus, where the Benefi-
ciary is also the Settlor, characterization of the Trustee as the agent
of the Settlor/Beneficiary, and consequent personal liability for the
latter, would seem unavoidable.) Further, as just noted in connection
with personal liability for the Settlor absent trust law, efforts to avoid
personal liability by contractual waivers from individual creditors
would be a very inferior substitute for trust law. Indeed, the risk
that a careless or unfaithful Trustee would fail to insist on waivers
would presumably be highest precisely where unlimited liability for
the Beneficiary is least appropriate, namely where the Beneficiary
lacks not only the competence to manage the property in trust by
himself, but also the ability to monitor the Trustee.
At least so far as voluntary creditors are concerned, trust law's
reversal of the agency law rule seems efficient. First, although the
beneficiary receives the benefit - the residual returns - from the
trust property, in common uses of the trust he typically exercises lit-
tle direct control over it. Consequently, the beneficial incentive ef-
fects of personal liability for the Beneficiary would generally be
modest at best.41
Second, and perhaps more importantly, since title to the trust
property is in the Trustee's rather than the Beneficiary's name, per-
sons who are contemplating extending credit to the trust are unlikely
to be misled into believing that they will be able to rely on the Benefi-
ciary's personal assets for satisfaction of their claims, and can make
appropriate adjustments in the terms on which they extend credit.
The ability of creditors to make those adjustments is enhanced, more-
over, by the fact that private trusts are most commonly employed
where the property in trust consists of a discrete pool of assets that
are segregated from other assets owned by the Beneficiary and whose
management is unrelated to that of the Beneficiary's other assets,
40. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 140, 144, 186.
41. Moreover, in the traditional three-party trust (as opposed to two-party trusts
in which an individual simply delegates management of property to a an expert for
the individual's own benefit), the original decisions to create the trust, to contribute
assets to it, and to select the Trustee are all made, not by the Beneficiary, but by the
Settlor, so that personal liability for the Beneficiary would also have no useful incen-
tives with respect to creation of the trust.
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and by the fact that the Trustee (if she wishes to avoid personal lia-
bility herself) will signal to third parties that they are dealing with a
trust, which will put those third parties on clear notice that the liabil-
ity of the Beneficiary is limited to the trust assets.
Third, as with limited liability for the Settlor, limited liability for
the Beneficiary (or the Beneficiary/Settlor) is likely to minimize the
total costs of monitoring for the creditors of the Property in trust and
the Beneficiary combined, and hence minimize the total costs of
credit. Or at least this seems true for the purposes for which trusts
are commonly used, such as asset management. Where it is not true,
it is open to the Settlor/Beneficiary to assume personal liability for
trust debts explicitly or to adopt a different organizational form, such
as a partnership with the Trustee, which automatically brings per-
sonal liability and hence pledges his personal assets as security for
transactions with the Property in trust.
11. RELATIONSHIP WITH THIRD PARTIES ACQUIRING THE PROPERTY
IN TRUST
Another class of third parties whose contractual relationships are af-
fected by trust law are persons to whom the Trustee sells or donates
Property in trust. Under the law of trusts, if the trustee transfers
trust property to someone in breach of the terms of the trust, the ben-
eficiary can recover the property and any income derived from it if
the transferee is anyone other than a good faith purchaser who gives
something of value in exchange for the property (i.e., is not a donee)
and has no notice of the trust. The beneficiary's claims, moreover,
are supported by an equitable lein on the property and its proceeds. 42
It is easy to rationalize, on efficiency grounds, a rule at least this pro-
tective of the Beneficiary: in the circumstances in which the rule op-
erates, the third-party transferee is almost by definition a lower-cost
monitor of the Trustee's breach of duty than is the Beneficiary.
If the default rule were different - if, for example, a purchaser
from the trustee always took good title - then it would be virtually
impossible for the Settlor, the Trustee, and the Beneficiary to estab-
lish by contractual means the regime that is now the trust law de-
fault rule. This rule, then, is a significant contribution that the law
makes to the creation of trust-like relationships. The extent to which
it is a contribution of trust law, however, is subject to debate. The
remedies that the common law of agency gives to principals when
their agents make unauthorized transfers of property are of similar
character. 43 Perhaps more important than the default rule remedies,
42. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§287-295.
43. One cannot say precisely what rules agency law would provide in the absence
of trust law, since agency law explicitly incorporates the trust law rules when an
agent holds title for the benefit of the principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency
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moreover, is the way in which trust law facilitates signaling to third
parties the existence of the trust-like relationship, and hence helps
put them on notice that the Trustee lacks authority to make the
transfer.
12. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION OF TRUST LAw
In sum, it appears that the important contribution of trust law
lies not in its ordering, via default rules of contract, of the relation-
ships among the three principal parties to a trust-like relationship -
the Settlor, the Trustee, and the Beneficiary - but rather in its or-
dering of the relationships between those persons and third parties
with whom they deal. It is the latter relationships that, owing to
high transaction costs, cannot be easily rearranged by contractual
means.
The most significant of the contractual default rules that trust
law establishes with respect to third parties are those governing cred-
itors' rights. Those rules provide a convenient means by which the
three principal parties can partition off a discrete set of assets - the
property in trust - not only for separate delegated management, but
also for purposes of pledging those assets, taken together, to a dis-
tinct group of creditors as security.
The modern commercial uses of the trust form, which are now by
far the dominant uses, illustrate quite clearly the crucial role that
creditors' rights play in trust law.
Consider, first, the pension fund. In the United States, the typi-
cal pension fund is a pool of assets that is accumulated as a reserve
with which to pay the pensions of the employees at a given firm, and
that is both funded and managed by the corporation whose employees
are covered by the fund.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
requires that pension fund assets be held in trust form.44 A critically
important consequence of this requirement - and presumably the
principal motivation for it - is to assure that the fund's assets will be
immune from claims of the corporation's creditors. If it were other-
wise - if, for example, a pension fund were just an investment ac-
count maintained by the corporation within its corporate shell -
then the employees' pensions would always be subject to the risk of
the corporation's insolvency. Thus, bankruptcy of the corporaton
could deprive the employees not only of their jobs but of their retire-
§202A. But compare id. §§200-01, concerning the extent to which a principal is bound
when an agent makes an unauthorized transfer of a chattel whose possession has
been entrusted to her.
44. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §403, 29 U.S.C. §1103.
There are limited exceptions, including principally assets of a pension plan that con-
sist of insurance contracts or policies. Id.
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ment savings as well. Worse, if pension assets were available to the
corporation's creditors, corporate shareholders and trustees would
have both the incentive and the ability to have the corporation take
on inefficiently risky investments, knowing that if the investments
succeed the shareholders will get the gains, while losses will be borne
in substantial part by the employees.
ERISA's insistence on use of the trust form does not, in contrast,
serve as a means of imposing on the trustees of pension funds the
standard form fiduciary duties that trust law imposes on trustees.
Instead, ERISA spells out those fiduciary duties on its own, and thus
imposes them directly without relying on trust law.45 One reason for
this is to impose on the trustees of pension funds some detailed obli-
gations appropriate to such funds.46 Another, presumably, is to limit
the flexibility that trust law might otherwise afford to deviate from
important elements of the standard form duties.
Immunity from the creditors of the fund's trustee is also a critical
reason for use of the trust form for mutual funds. If a fund's trustee
were simply the agent of the fund's investors, then the fund's portfo-
lio would always be at risk of the fund trustee's insolvency - a risk
that the investors would have great difficulty monitoring or control-
ling. For this reason, mutual funds that are not formed as trusts are
typically formed as business corporations, which achieves the same
immunity of the fund's portfolio from the involvency of the trustees.
As with pension funds, the trust form is clearly not being used
for mutual funds to take advantage of the particular fiduciary duties
that are the default rule in trust law. The fact that nearly half of all
mutual funds are formed as corporations, which have somewhat less
rigorous standard form fiduciary duties (roughly those of agency law),
is one indication of this. Another is that the Investment Company
Act of 1940, which governs mutual funds, imposes its own fiduciary
duties on the trustees of investment companies. 47
Another example: in a typical asset securitization transaction, a
business corporation forms a private trust and transfers to that trust
title to some subset of the corporation's assets - say, its accounts
receivable - that yield an income stream. The trust in turn issues
bonds that are backed by those assets, and pays the proceeds of the
bond sale to the corporation. Thus, the trust is used as an intermedi-
45. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 §§404-12, 29 U.S.C.
§§1104-12.
46. See George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees
§255 (2d ed. 1992).
47. Investment Company Act of 1940 §17, 15 U.S.C. §80a-17, sets out rules on
conflicts of interest and establishes minimum standards of care for the directors or
trustees of investment companies. Nearly all the terms of the Act, however, are
designed to protect the investors who are the beneficial owners of the assets of invest-
ment companies.
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ary in a transaction in which a corporation pledges some of its assets
as security to back an issue of marketable bonds.
Why use the trust, rather than just have the corporation issue
the bonds itself, pledging its accounts receivable as security? The an-
swer is that the trust permits a very clear partitioning of the corpora-
tion's assets into different subsets that can be separately pledged as
security to different groups of creditors. The result is to reduce the
total costs of monitoring for the corporation's creditors, and hence re-
duce the corporation's cost of credit. 48 For this purpose, an essential
feature of the trust is that it is (in the language of the securitization
literature) "bankruptcy remote" - that is, it will be unaffected by the
bankruptcy of the corporation, and in particular will maintain secure
title to the assets it holds (the corporation's accounts receivable, in
our example) even if the corporation goes into bankruptcy. 49 Thus,
the accounts receivable can be pledged more effectively as security for
the bonds than would be the case if the corporation were to issue the
bonds itself. By this means, corporations that, taken as a whole,
present a relatively high level of risk to their creditors are able to
secure financing through the issuance of high-grade bonds. 50 Once
again, it is the immunity of the Property in trust (the accounts receiv-
able) from the bankruptcy of the Settlor (the corporation) and the
Trustee (which would be the corporation in the absence of the trust)
that is the crucial contribution of the trust form to this transaction.
The particular fiduciary duties imposed by trust law, on the other
hand, are of little importance, since they are largely displaced by the
highly detailed provisions of the trust agreement. 51
Private trusts serve a variety of useful transactional purposes.
The most important contribution of trust law to the accomplishment
of these purposes is that it facilitates a particular partitioning of as-
sets for purposes of pledging those assets to creditors. Unlike other
aspects of the trust as an institution - including, in particular, the
fiduciary duties that trust law imposes - this asset partitioning
would be difficult or impossible to arrange if the law of trusts did not
exist.
48. See Hill, "Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons," 74 Wash. U. L.
Q. 1061, 1090-93 (1996).
49. See Schwarcz, "The Alchemy of Asset Securitization," 1 Stan. J. L. Bus., &
Fin. 133, 135 (1994).
50. Hill, supra n. 48, at 1073.
51. Id. at 1126, n. 163.
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